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SUMMARY
Over the last 20 years, utility regulators have relaxed their oversight of cost-of-
service regulation and this holds true for Alberta, where such regulation determines
the fees associated with oil and gas pipeline usage. The traditional method has
been for regulators to issue binding decisions on a firm’s cost of service after taking
evidence at a formal hearing. Many regulators now prefer to encourage parties to
settle a cost-of-service agreement through a negotiated settlement, which the
regulator then approves. This process not only saves the cost of a hearing, it also
permits firms and consumers to trade costs and benefits, settling on a final price
more favourable to both. The author details how this arrangement can negatively
impact future consumers by allowing the firm to defer the true burden of its
depreciation expenses in return for inflated capital costs. Such a settlement lowers
prices for the present but saddles future consumers with higher prices.
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* Thanks to Dr. Michal Moore and Dr. Robert Mansell for taking an interest in this
topic and special thanks to Dr. Jeffery Church for bringing the recent TCPL interim
tolls application to my attention.
INTRODUCTION
The use of negotiated settlements as an alternative to strict cost-of-service-based regulatory
mechanisms has become increasingly prevalent over the last 20 years. Regulatory authorities
including the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC), the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in the United States and the National Energy Board (NEB) in Canada,
have all facilitated settlements as an alternative to classic cost-of-service-based litigation.
While motivations vary by jurisdiction, in general these regulatory authorities believe that
settlement outcomes are associated with cost savings and increased freedoms unavailable under
strict cost-of-service litigation.1
Cost-of-service regulation (historically the standard for price-setting in regulated industries)
operates on a simple and intuitive theory: a firm’s revenue is restricted to a level equal to its
incurred costs. Prices set consistent with this constraint ensure the firm’s continued operation
(costs are covered) while providing the relevant good or service to consumers at a price equal
to cost (rather than allowing a monopoly-style mark up). In practice, a cost-of-service outcome
involves a toll hearing where cost inclusions are determined via formal litigation. In the course
of a hearing, firms and other interested parties present evidence on elements of the cost of
service ranging from the cost of input goods to the allowed rate of return on capital.
In a cost-of-service hearing, the firms are generally allowed to earn what is deemed a “fair”
rate of return on the capital assets employed by the firm. A fair rate of return can be loosely
defined as one that allows investors to earn a return on capital equal to the expected earnings
of comparable assets in the financial market. This implies a positive accounting profit
(revenues greater than costs in any accounting period) but zero economic profit since the return
on capital is equal to the opportunity cost of capital.
Negotiated settlement procedures differ between jurisdictions, but in general a settlement
outcome dispenses with the formal hearing altogether. The regulated firm and interested parties
negotiate the various elements of a cost of service without direct regulatory oversight and
present a completed toll application to the regulator indicating which parties (firms, consumers
and other interveners) support it. The application may include some details on the specific
elements included in the cost of service (although this varies) but it is not required to share
details on the negotiating process or in-depth evidence to support any of the claims made.
From this abbreviated summary it may not be apparent why regulators display a preference for
settlement outcomes over full cost-of-service hearings; however, negotiated settlements have
proven effective in mitigating some of the central problems associated with formal cost-of-
service toll hearings.2
1 Doucet and Littlechild, “Negotiated Settlements: The development of economic and legal thinking” Utilities Policy
14, (Dec 2006), P.266-277
Doucet and Littlechild  “Negotiated Settlements and the National Energy Board in Canada” Energy Policy 37 (2009),
P.4633-4644
Morgan, “Toward a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking”,  Law Forum, University of Illinois 1 (1978), 27-78 Schultz,.
Light-Handed Regulation, Alberta Law Review,  37;2 (1999), P.387-418
2 Doucet and Littlechild, “Negotiated Settlements: The development of economic and legal thinking” Doucet and
Littlechild  “Negotiated Settlements and the National Energy Board in Canada”  
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PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: SETTLEMENTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO HEARINGS
Regardless of the intuitive simplicity of the cost-of-service model, substantial problems persist
in its practical application. First, while cost-of-service prices may be optimal for any given
year introduced, over time the lack of a profit motive eliminates the regulated companies’
incentive to reduce costs. This has potential to lead to reduced productivity and poor product
quality.3 Additionally, the mechanism is difficult to implement without error since the regulator
is likely unable to directly identify the relevant costs incurred by the regulated firm. This
means that calculating a price consistent with the cost-of-service methodology is impossible
without a significant margin of error.
The formal litigation required to set a price based on cost-of-service calculations also presents
its own inefficiencies distinct from the aforementioned problems. Lawyers, expert witnesses
and the staff required to participate in a regulatory hearing all represent significant costs to
both the regulated firm and any consumers/interveners involved in the hearing.
Negotiated settlements were devised in part as a solution to these faults in the cost-of-service
model. Given the freedom to negotiate without direct regulatory oversight, the regulated firm
and its consumers are able to devise incentive schemes and make trade-offs between each
party’s costs and benefits that are not possible under the jurisdiction of a regulatory hearing.
Allowing for trade-offs between the interests of regulated firms and consumers has the
potential to reintroduce an incentive to reduce costs since the negotiating consumers may be
able to offer gains to a regulated firm that a regulatory authority would not have authority to
bestow. The costs associated with formal litigation (legal fees and expert witnesses) are also
avoided.4
These benefits are clearly reflected in the preferences of regulated firms and their consumers.
Regulatory boards and commissions often cite the positive response and preference of both the
regulated firms and the associated consumers as an indication of the achieved benefits of
settlements over a more constrictive cost-of-service model.5
WINNERS AND LOSERS:  WHO MAKES IT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE?
While negotiated settlements have proven to be a capable vessel for incentive agreements and
cost reductions, the relative detachment of regulatory authorities from the toll-setting process
remains a deficiency. In most jurisdictions, the regulatory authority has a duty to represent the
interest of current and future consumers. In a settlement outcome, the lack of input from future
consumers (or an agent representing their interests), combined with the added freedom inherent
in settlement outcomes, can potentially produce an outcome that leaves future generations with
a higher share of costs. 
3 Sappington, “Regulating Service Quality: A Survey”, Journal of Regulatory Economics; 27:2 (2005) P.123-154
4 Doucet and Littlechild, “Negotiated Settlements: The development of economic and legal thinking” Morgan,
“Toward a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking”
5 Vollman, Toward incentive regulation of Canadian pipelines, Fifth Annual DOE-NARUC Natural Gas Conference,
St Louis, Missouri, April 28 – May 1 (1996), available at NEB website.
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As already mentioned, the cost-of-service model limits regulated firms to a “fair” rate of
return. In a settlement outcome, this restriction is often relaxed either explicitly (by a direct
guideline from the regulator) or implicitly (since evidentiary support is not required to
substantiate the rate of return specified in a settlement application). We might expect that
inflating the cost of service by introducing an increase in the rate of return would imply higher
prices. Since allowing higher prices is inconsistent with the expected motives of rational
consumers, we might not expect consumers to support a settlement outcome with an inflated
cost of capital; however, the scope for trade-offs between the rate of return and the depreciation
expense can lead to increased profit for the regulated firm and a lower price for its current
consumers.6
The trade-off takes the following form: the regulated firm reduces the book value of its
depreciation expense by lowering the depreciation rate employed. This lowers the recorded
book value of the regulated firm's costs and therefore (under cost-of-service regulation) reduces
the price paid by each consumer. The reduction in regulated price occurs since the price is set
to provide the regulated firm with revenues equal to its recorded book value costs.
To complete the trade-off, the reduction in depreciation expense is accompanied by the
introduction of a positive margin on the cost of capital. This means that the firm is allowed to
inflate the book value of its capital costs, earning a rate of return in excess of the “fair” rate of
return described above. The end result is that current tolls are decreased by an amount equal to
the reduction in depreciation less the increase in return on capital. In effect, this serves to shift
the burden of depreciation further into the future. It should be noted that the book value of
depreciation represents a significant abstraction from the path of physical depreciation, but it is
the book value that determines the firm’s outstanding capital stock. Thus, the path of physical
depreciation is largely irrelevant to this trade-off.7
FIGURE 1: Remaining Capital under Deferred Depreciation
6 Fellows, G.K. “Negotiated settlements with a cost of service backstop: The consequences for depreciation” Energy
Policy; 39:3 (March 2011),  P.1505-1513
7 As an example, a pipeline will effectively retain its productive value until its market disappears and normal wear is
covered by maintenance costs. This would imply a path of physical deprecation where all depreciation occurs in the
final period of operation. However, the book value of depreciation spreads out the cost over the pipeline’s entire life.
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Figure 1 shows the book value of depreciation on a hypothetical million-dollar asset, given a
change from a 4 percent straight-line depreciation rate to one at 2.5 percent.8 The figure
illustrates how a small change in depreciation expense can allow a firm to retain a significant
portion of the book value of capital longer. While the initial capital level is hypothetical, the
change from 4 percent to 2.5 percent is not without precedent. TransCanada Pipelines (TCPL),
regulated by the NEB, increased its composite depreciation rate by more than 1 percent
between 2001 and 2003 following a breakdown in their negotiations with shippers and a return
to traditional tolls set via a formal hearing.
Figure 2 shows how this retained capital can add to earnings given a small margin on the rate
of return.
FIGURE 2: Profit from a 2% increase in ROR
The dark grey area shows the profit earned from a positive two percent margin on the rate of
return above the “fair” level on the standard book value of the same million-dollar asset
assumed in Figure 1. The light grey area indicates the added profits from deferring depreciation
by depreciating at 2.5 percent rather than the base 4 percent.
The incentive to reduce depreciation expense is self-reinforcing. As long as the regulated firm
is assured that lifetime depreciation will be sufficient to cover its fixed costs, it will elect to
retain capital for longer if it can earn a return in excess of the “fair” rate of return granted
under cost of service.
The implication of all this is that regulated firms under negotiated settlement outcomes are able
to borrow from the future (by deferring depreciation expense) while simultaneously inflating
the book value of their rate base without actually employing more capital. A notable
observation here is that due to the deferral of depreciation, consumers will also find it
preferable to allow for the inflated cost of capital (as an alternative to status quo depreciation
and cost of capital) since the increase in current prices from the change in included capital
costs is more than offset by the reduction resulting from deferred depreciation. 
8 A “straight-line” depreciation schedule apportions the depreciation expense out equally across each period. A popular
alternative is the “declining balance” depreciation schedule, which sets a depreciation expense as a fixed proportion
of the remaining capital stock in each period. 
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The increase in capital return need not be greater than the reduction in depreciation expense
in order to be beneficial to the pipeline. A mutually beneficial relationship between deferred
depreciation and an increased rate of return always exists given a small set of conditions
involving the relative cost of capital (or discount rate) of regulated firms and consumers.9
Absent from the simple figures above is the inevitable increase in depreciation expense
required to ensure full depreciation. From the consumer perspective, even anticipating an
increase in future depreciation,  there are two cases under which it would be rational to allow
the regulated firm a rate of return above the “fair” rate:
First, if the consumer plans to stop purchasing/contracting with the regulated
firm before the firm retires its assets, future consumers will end up paying a
portion of the depreciation that the current consumers should have paid.
This makes current consumers unambiguously better off.
Second, if the consumer has a higher cost of capital/discount rate compared
to the regulated firm’s “fair” rate of return plus the allowed increase, the
consumer can profitably defer the depreciation cost into the future. In this
case the consumer is essentially borrowing from the firm, and paying an
interest rate equal to the regulated firm’s “fair” rate of return plus the
allowed increase.
In any case, future shippers unambiguously lose, which is not surprising, as they have had no
say in the negotiations leading to a settlement. This issue is not present in a litigated cost-of-
service outcome since cost-of-service toll hearings, by their nature, include comments and
decisions made directly by a regulatory authority; if a regulator has a preference, stated or not,
against placing an undue burden on future consumers, this will be reflected in the outcome.
Additionally, a cost-of-service outcome by design will remove the incentive to defer
depreciation expense if a “fair” rate of return is identified and stipulated.
DEPRECIATION DEFERRALS IN PRACTICE
With regards to the firms’ choice of depreciation path, the implication here is not unique in the
academic literature. Burness and Patrick (1992) have already argued that a positive margin on
the “fair” rate of return can induce a deferral of depreciation.10 The notable addition made here
is that deferred depreciation is shown to be beneficial to the current consumers as well as the
regulated firm.
9 See: Fellows (2011a) for a formal proof.
10 Burness and Patrick, “Optimal Depreciation, Payments to Capital, and Natural Monopoly Regulation”, Journal of
Regulatory Economics 4;1 (1992), P.35-50
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The act of deferred depreciation under a settlement outcome has also been somewhat exposed
empirically by other research. Littlechild (2009) conducted an empirical investigation of
negotiated settlements in the Florida electricity market and identified similar actions in the
deferral of depreciation expense relative to the traditional outcome. Littlechild concluded that
consumers preferred “jam today in the form of refunds and rate reductions” rather than “lower
prices tomorrow.”11
Outcomes of this nature are also observable in Canada. Upon adopting tolls based on a
negotiated settlement in 1996, TCPL and its stakeholders agreed to freeze depreciation rates at
1996 levels. Rates remained frozen until 2001 despite significant firm-service contract non-
renewals in the late 1990s which led to a reduction in the forecast economic life of some of the
Pipeline’s assets. Between 2001 (when TCPL defaulted to a litigated outcome) and 2003 (just
before the firm returned to a negotiated-settlement procedure) the effective depreciation rate
used in its toll setting rose from 2.64 percent to 3.42 percent.12
Without the exposition above, it would not be intuitively apparent why TCPL would allow the
depreciation expense to remain at 1996 levels when presented with contract non-renewals.
Instead, these non-renewals should have prompted an earlier increase in the depreciation rate.
A large proportion of the 2001-2003 increases in depreciation expense were due to TCPL’s
amortization of a significant investment in computer software and upgrades over a relatively
short five year period.13 In other years this account had not been as significant. While the
timing of the computer upgrades and the relatively short amortization period may not be
related to the movement from negotiated settlement back to litigated outcome, the fact remains
that the resulting jump in depreciation expense occurred at the same time as the change in
effective regulatory mechanism.
As of early December 2010, TCPL tolls heading into 2011 were to have been set by the terms
of a negotiated settlement reached in 2007. The planned 2011 tolls (reflecting a significant
fixed cost spread over fewer shippers and lower volumes) represented a significant increase
over the 2010 tolls (already representing an earlier cost deferral of approximately $120
million). The TCPL interim toll application dated December 9, 2010 proposed to reduce the
pipeline’s cost of service (and by extension its tolls) by reducing the composite mainline
depreciation. The application proposes reducing the composite depreciation rate “from
approximately 3.0% to approximately 1.9%, which will reduce the depreciation expense by
approximately $150 million in each year during the Term.”14
11 Littlechild, “The bird in hand: stipulated settlements and electricity regulation in Florida”, Utilities Policy 17(2009),
P.32-33
12 NEB., RH-1-2002, TransCanada PipeLines Limited, Tolls application, (July 2003)
13 For an explanation of the relationship between amortization rates for specific asset classes and the full path of
composite depreciation in the context of the above discussion see: 
Fellows, G.K. Negotiated Settlements in the Pipeline Services Market  M.A. thesis, published by LAP LAMBERT
Academic Publishing, (2011b); Appendix: A
14 TCPL interim tolls application dated December 9th 2010. Online at: https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/livelink.exe?func
=ll&objId=656798&objAction=Open <https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/livelink.exe?func= ll&amp;objId=
656798&amp;objAction=Open>
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This trend towards lower depreciation under negotiated settlements is not confined to TCPL.
Aggregate statistics for five of the largest pipeline companies operating in Canada suggest that
the average depreciation expense is reduced by anywhere between 2% and 22% under
negotiated settlement relative to traditional litigation. The predicted difference between
litigated and negotiated settlement depreciation expense is dependent on pipeline
characteristics (size, age, region etc.). Interested readers can find these results presented in
more detail in Fellows (2011b).
POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
The above exposition illustrates the dangers associated with cost deferrals in a settlement
outcome even when there is a clear benefit to all parties involved. Debating whether past
depreciation rates or cost deferrals were appropriate given the circumstances is of little use
going forward, but the policy prescription seems clear. Under negotiated settlement outcomes,
more attention should be given to depreciation methodologies and cost deferrals to ensure that
regulated firms maintain a strong financial position.
In addition to the concerns presented above, the reader should be aware that NEB staff has
cited a number of considerations in informal discussions that have not been explicitly
addressed here. The reduced risk of uncertainty in toll outcomes from the pipeline’s perspective
and the more amicable nature of pipeline shipper relations under negotiated settlements are
cited as benefits and the analysis here is not meant to contradict any of these claims; however,
it should be apparent from this discussion that negotiated settlements do not represent a
panacea for the practice of economic regulation. Any negotiated settlement must be
accompanied by a strict depreciation methodology or an informed rate-of-return constraint
enforced by the regulatory authority in order to protect the interests of future consumers.
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